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THE EXTRAORDINARY CRIMINAL LAW 
JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE RALPH GANTS 
HON. NANCY GERTNER (RET.)* 
Abstract: The untimely passing of Chief Justice Ralph Gants represented a tre-
mendous loss to the Massachusetts court system and communities throughout the 
Commonwealth. Ralph Gants positively impacted countless lives through his work 
both on and off the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. From his advocacy 
against minimum mandatory sentencing and his promotion of racial justice, to his 
efforts to advance eyewitness identification, first-degree murder theory, and Brady 
protections for criminal defendants, Chief Justice Gants’s legacy reflects the vi-
sionary grandeur with which he tackled every issue presented to him. This Article 
honors his immense judicial legacy by considering several of the areas of the law 
where Chief Justice Gants’s positive impact was most clearly felt. 
INTRODUCTION 
The death of Ralph Gants was a blow to those of us who knew him, and 
especially to those of us privileged to consider him a dear friend. It was also a 
blow to justice in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. To say that the Com-
monwealth’s loss of Justice Gants parallels the nation’s loss of Supreme Court 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg is not an understatement. 
Justice Ralph Gants was an extraordinary judge on an extraordinary court. 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) has counted legal giants 
among its members—Benjamin Kaplan, Charles Fried, Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Jr., Robert Braucher, and Margaret Marshall.1 Its opinions are widely cited in 
decisions of other courts and in academic journals, and are reprinted in law 
texts and taught in law schools across the country. SJC decisions have been 
particularly important given the substantial changes in the composition of the 
U.S. Supreme Court. Historically, the SJC has been far more protective of 
rights than has the U.S. Supreme Court.2 
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* Judge (D. Mass. 1994–2011); Senior Lecturer of Law, Harvard Law School  
1 Three went from the SJC to join the United States Supreme Court: William Cushing (1790); 
Horace Gray (1882); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (1902). 
2 See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (striking down 
state laws that limited marriage to heterosexual couples based on the equal protection and due process 
guarantees of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights before the U.S. Supreme Court did so); Com-
monwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548, 550 (Mass. 1985) (“[P]robable cause to issue a search warrant 
should be determined by a stricter standard in this Commonwealth than under the Fourth Amendment 
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Justice Ralph Gants surely joined this pantheon. His decisions addressed 
cutting-edge issues and sought to reflect modern understandings of longstanding 
rules, including those addressing eyewitness identification or the longstanding 
and highly-criticized doctrine of felony murder. Although he deeply respected 
SJC precedent and the opinions of his colleagues, he nevertheless encouraged 
them to revisit precedents through the depth of his analysis and the thoughtful-
ness of his approach. He also understood his role as Chief Justice in adminis-
tering the Massachusetts court system. He coordinated his work on the bench 
with significant initiatives, such as calling for a wide-ranging study on racial 
disparities in the Massachusetts criminal justice system. He acutely appreciat-
ed the role of the SJC vis-à-vis other players in the political system. Through 
his concurring opinions and speeches, he urged legislative reform when the 
court alone could not effectuate the changes justice required. These were not 
decisions made on the left or the right; they were thoughtful and incontestably 
humane ones. 
This Article presents the legacy of the late Chief Justice Gants within a 
few of the numerous areas of law where his positive judicial influence is most 
strongly felt. Part I discusses his efforts to end mandatory minimum sentenc-
ing.3 Part II discusses the advancements in eyewitness identification jury in-
structions under Chief Justice Gants’s leadership.4 Part III assesses his opin-
ions that limited the felony murder doctrine and first-degree murder theory.5 
Finally, Part IV evaluates Chief Justice Gants’s expansion of Brady protections 
for criminal defendants in the Massachusetts court system.6 
I. WORK FOR THE PROMOTION OF RACIAL JUSTICE AND  
AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCING 
Ralph Gants was Chief Justice for less than a year when he delivered ex-
traordinary testimony before the Massachusetts Joint Committee on the Judici-
ary calling for the abolition of mandatory minimum sentencing. Through this 
testimony, he brought issues of racial justice to the fore years before the Black 
                                                                                                                           
[to the U.S. Constitution] . . . . [T]he test for determining probable cause is stricter under [Article] 14 
of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution than under the Fourth Amendment [to 
the U.S. Constitution] . . . .”); Moe v. Sec’y of Admin. & Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387, 405 (Mass. 1981) 
(concluding that the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights affords greater degree of protection to a 
woman’s right to choose abortion than does the Federal Constitution); Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Dist. v. 
Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1287 (Mass. 1980) (holding the death penalty statute to be unconstitutional 
under Article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights even if permissible under the U.S. Consti-
tution). 
 3 See infra notes 7–12 and accompanying text. 
 4 See infra notes 13–40  and accompanying text. 
 5 See infra notes 41–49  and accompanying text. 
 6 See infra notes 50–63 and accompanying text. 
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Lives Matter movement. Chief Justice Gants was unafraid to say out loud what 
the data showed: “[I]n 2013, 44% of all persons convicted of drug offenses 
were persons of color, but 75% of all persons convicted of drug offenses with 
mandatory minimum sentences were persons of color.”7 He noted, “If [the leg-
islature] do[es] not abolish minimum mandatory sentences for drug offenses, 
[it] must accept the tragic fact that this disparate treatment of persons of color 
will be allowed to continue.”8 Years later, in October 2016, Chief Justice Gants 
underscored these concerns in his State of the Judiciary address when he called 
for a research project in collaboration with Harvard Law School to take “a hard 
look at how we can better fulfill our promise to provide equal justice for every 
litigant.”9 The results of that study were stunning and more than confirmed the 
2013 data Chief Justice Gants had cited. Racial disparities were not a one off; 
they were persistent and substantial.10 
In addition to his promotion of racial justice, Chief Justice Gants also 
recognized the significance of mandatory minimum sentences in undermining 
important justice reinvestment initiatives: “[e]very time a judge is required to 
impose a mandatory minimum sentence that is greater than the sentence that 
the judge otherwise would have imposed if the judge were allowed to apply 
individualized, evidence-based best practices in sentencing, the taxpayer is 
paying money to incarcerate that offender longer than he or she should be in-
carcerated.”11 Chief Justice Gants believed that the money spent on razor wire 
and walls was better spent on programs dealing with opiate substance abuse or 
mental health treatment. Finally, he believed that mandatory minimum sen-
tences should be abolished in the interest of simple fairness. Mandatory sen-
tences are based on the false “one size fits all” principle. This is especially 
misguided with respect to drug offenses. Consider, for example, “[t]he drug 
dealer and his girlfriend who helps him package the drugs, the drug kingpin 
and the courier, the dealer who sells drugs to support his drug habit and the 
                                                                                                                           
7 Ralph D. Gants, Chief J., Mass. Supreme Jud. Ct., Testimony of Supreme Judicial Court Chief 
Justice Ralph D. Gants Before the Joint Committee on the Judiciary (June 9, 2015) [hereinafter Gants 




9 Ralph D. Gants, Chief J., Mass. Supreme Jud. Ct., Annual Address: State of the Judiciary 5 
(Oct. 20, 2016) (transcript available from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court), https://www.mass.
gov/doc/2016-state-of-the-judiciary-address-by-sjc-chief-justice-ralph-d-gants-oct-20-2016/down
load [https://perma.cc/T4A2-8XYB]. 
10 See generally ELIZABETH TSAI BISHOP, BROOK HOPKINS, CHIJINDU OBIOFUMA & FELIX 
OWUSU, THE CRIM. JUST. POL’Y PROGRAM: HARVARD L. SCH., RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE MASSA-
CHUSETTS CRIMINAL SYSTEM (2020), https://hls.harvard.edu/content/uploads/2020/11/Massachusetts-
Racial-Disparity-Report-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VCL-G4UT]. 
11 Gants Joint Committee on the Judiciary Testimony, supra note 7. 
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dealer who sells to gets rich”—these actors can face identical criminal charges, 
even though they clearly “do not deserve the same sentence . . . .”12 
II. ADVANCEMENTS IN EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION PRACTICES 
Perhaps one of Chief Justice Gants’s most significant achievements—as a 
justice writing opinions, as Chief Justice of the SJC supervising the Massachu-
setts court system, and as an administrator seamlessly working with police of-
ficers, court administrators, defense lawyers, and prosecutors—concerned 
eyewitness identification practices. Chief Justice Gants worked tirelessly to 
align the law with the evolving science of memory and perception. In 2009, 
shortly after then-Justice Gants joined the court, the SJC heard Commonwealth 
v. Silva-Santiago, “an appeal from a murder conviction in which the defendant 
challenged the reliability of photographic arrays that had led several eyewit-
nesses to identify him as the killer.”13 The defendant claimed the arrays were 
suggestive because the photographs were shown to the eyewitnesses simulta-
neously, rather than sequentially. Justice Gants rejected the defendant’s argu-
ment that reversal was required.  
 Although his holding was entirely consistent with existing SJC prece-
dent, in dicta he raised far broader concerns.14 He explained that the eyewit-
ness instruction protocols implemented by the U.S. Department of Justice—
developed to avoid skewing eyewitness conclusions—had not been followed in 
the case.15 Justice Gants added a warning, as he often did, in the hopes of in-
fluencing police practices without requiring court-imposed rules: “We decline 
at this time to hold that the absence of any protocol or comparable warnings to 
                                                                                                                           
12 Id. Indeed, in a concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Baez, Justice Gants encouraged the 
“Legislature to consider the wisdom and fairness of the mandatory minimum aspect of those enhanced 
sentences, especially where the predicate offenses were committed when the defendant was a juve-
nile.” 104 N.E.3d 646, 650 (Mass. 2018) (Gants, C.J, concurring); see also Commonwealth v. Le-
Blanc, 62 N.E.3d 34, 38 (Mass. 2016) (Gants, C.J., concurring) (encouraging the Legislature to “har-
monize” contradictory provisions concerning whether a driver needed to remain at the scene after 
causing an accident); Commonwealth v. Burgos, 19 N.E.3d 843, 856 (Mass. 2014) (Gants, C.J., con-
curring) (calling for legislative changes to the Massachusetts wiretap statute); Commonwealth v. 
Tavares, 945 N.E.2d 329, 341 (Mass. 2011) (Gants, J., concurring) (same). See generally Tad Heuer, 
Chief Justice Gants and the Power of Concurrence, BOS. BAR J., Winter Edition 2021, at 19, https://
bostonbar.org/docs/default-document-library/bbj---winter-2021-vol-65-no-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6CP9-3TCQ] (describing Chief Justice Gants’s influential concurring opinions). 
13 Eric A. Haskell, Aligning Science and Law in the Realm of Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 
BOS. BAR J., Winter Edition 2021, at 27, https://bostonbar.org/docs/default-document-library/bbj---
winter-2021-vol-65-no-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CP9-3TCQ]; see Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 
906 N.E.2d 299, 309 (Mass. 2009), abrogated by Commonwealth v. Moore, 109 N.E.3d 484 (Mass. 
2018). 
14 Silva-Santiago, 906 N.E.2d at 312–13; see, e.g., Haskell, supra note 13, at 27. 
 15 Silva-Santiago, 906 N.E.2d at 312. 
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the eyewitnesses requires that the identifications be found inadmissible, but we 
expect such protocols to be used in the future.”16 
Delving still further, Justice Gants recognized a “debate among scholars 
and practitioners [as to] whether the sequential showing of photographs leads 
to greater accuracy”17 compared to a concurrent showing, referencing  law re-
view articles and an article from the American Psychological Association.18 He 
determined that, “[w]hile that debate evolves,” identifications rendered by way 
of either process could be admitted into evidence.19 The decision reflected his 
growing interest not simply in the decades of precedent defining when eyewit-
ness identification should be challenged, but the extent to which that precedent 
aligned with the science. This decision prefigured what he would do next. 
In 2011, in Commonwealth v. Walker, Justice Gants wrote for the court, 
again declining to accept the notion that a simultaneous display of photographs 
was less accurate than a sequential display.20 Justice Gants further declined the 
defendant’s broader invitation to “revisit” the court’s “jurisprudence under art. 
12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and common-law principles of 
fairness, and require a trial judge to . . . exclude unreliable eyewitness testimo-
ny” even when the source of that unreliability was not police conduct or miscon-
duct.21 Massachusetts case law required such exclusion only when the police 
were responsible for the suggestive identification procedures, not when circum-
stances beyond their control cast doubt on the identification’s reliability.22 
Indeed, the SJC’s position perfectly aligned with that of the U.S. Supreme 
Court in a case on that Court’s docket at the same time as Walker. In 2011, in 
Perry v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court—with Justice Ginsburg writing—
expressly held that the Constitution’s Due Process Clause did not require ex-
clusion “when the identification was not procured under unnecessarily sugges-
tive circumstances arranged by law enforcement.”23 The Court would not re-
consider a 1967 precedent, United States v. Wade, notwithstanding the scien-
tific consensus in the intervening years that showed the flaws of memory and 
eyewitness identification.24 Although the Supreme Court was unwilling to con-
sider the scientific evidence of potential unreliability—even when police con-
duct was not involved—Justice Gants was. 
                                                                                                                           
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
 18 Id.at 312 & n.22. 
19 Id. at 312–13. 
20 953 N.E.2d 195, 205–06 (Mass. 2011) 
21 Id. at 208–09. 
22 See id. (describing Massachusetts case law on the admissibility of eyewitness identifications). 
 23 565 U.S. 228, 248 (2012). 
24 Id. at 242–43 (citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967)) (noting the possibility of 
lineup eyewitness identification’s inappropriate impact on witnesses). 
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Justice Gants’s willingness lurked in a footnote to Walker. He explained,  
Because eyewitness identification evidence is the greatest source of 
wrongful convictions but also an invaluable law enforcement tool in 
obtaining accurate convictions, and because the research regarding 
eyewitness identification procedures is complex and evolving, we 
shall convene a study committee to consider how we can best deter 
unnecessarily suggestive procedures and whether existing model ju-
ry instructions provide adequate guidance to juries in evaluating 
eyewitness testimony.25 
Justice Gants cited approvingly to the 2011 decision of New Jersey’s 
highest court, State v. Henderson, decided only months before, that looked be-
yond police conduct. 26 Henderson called for a pretrial hearing to examine 
suggestive identification not only based on traditional “system variables” un-
der the state’s authority, such as pretrial identification, but also on “estimator 
variables” outside of the state’s authority.27 These included the victim’s 
“stress,” alcohol or drug use, problems of “memory decay,” issues concerning 
“cross-racial identification,” and the circumstances of the offense—all factors 
that the scientific literature made clear could profoundly affect reliability.28 
After Walker, the SJC created the SJC Study Group on Eyewitness Identi-
fication (Study Group). The Study Group was comprised of representatives 
from all corners of the profession, including law school professors and attor-
neys, and representatives from the four trial court departments, the Attorney 
General’s Office, the Public Defender’s Office, the Office of Inspector Gen-
eral, and the Massachusetts Chief of Police Association.29 The Study Group’s 
resulting 2013 report was wide ranging. It urged the SJC to take “judicial no-
tice” of certain “psychological principles” concerning the mechanisms of 
memory and recall, and of factors that degraded those mechanisms.30 The re-
port proposed a new jury instruction that would instruct the jury about the 
“findings of science” and the “often counterintuitive ways in which memory 
                                                                                                                           
25 953 N.E.2d at 208 n.16. 
26 Id. at 208 (citing State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011)) (analyzing multiple, interrelated 
variables that influence human memory). 
 27 27 A.3d at 896–902, 904–09. 
28 Id. at 921(providing a non-exhaustive list of estimator variables); see Walker, 953 N.E.2d at 
209 (describing estimator variables). 
29 See SUPREME JUD. CT. STUDY GRP. ON EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS TO THE JUSTICES, at i (2013), https://www.mass.gov/doc/supreme-judicial-court-study-group-
on-eyewitness-evidence-report-and-recommendations-to-the/download [https://perma.cc/NUW4-ELQ4] 
(listing the Study Group members). 
 30 Id. at 2. 
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works.”31 It also offered recommendations on best practices for police depart-
ments, pretrial hearings, and continued education for judges and practitioners. 
Shortly after the issuance of the report, Justice Gants was promoted to 
Chief Justice. At that time, three cases were on the court’s docket concerning 
aspects of eyewitness identification. Chief Justice Gants authored the opinion 
of each one. The Chief was justly proud of the work, as he described: 
During my first year as Chief Justice, the court overhauled its treat-
ment of first-time in-court positive eyewitness identifications in a 
pair of cases, Commonwealth v. Crayton and Commonwealth v. Col-
lins, and crafted a provisional model eyewitness identification jury 
instruction in Commonwealth v. Gomes, which was subsequently re-
vised after a public comment period. Meanwhile, individual police 
departments in Massachusetts have adopted new police protocols for 
eyewitness identification procedures, and legislation is pending that 
would establish uniform protocols. Eyewitness identification reform 
has progressed both inside and outside of the courts through a 
shared commitment to learning from reliable scientific research.32 
In Gomes, Chief Justice Gants adopted a modified version of the Study 
Group’s proposal. The Gomes jury instruction continued to urge the jury to 
consider “common sense” factors that the existing model instructions required, 
including the witness’s opportunity to view the perpetrator and the quality of 
the witness’s perception.33 The court noted, however, that “common sense is 
not enough”34 because some factors bearing on reliability are “not commonly 
known,” and are even “counterintuitive.”35 Moving forward, jury instructions 
had to include additional information derived from a “near consensus in the 
relevant scientific community.”36 The court stated, 
(1) human memory does not operate like a video recording that a 
person can replay to recall what happened; (2) a witness’s level of 
confidence in an identification may not indicate its accuracy; (3) 
high levels of stress can reduce the likelihood of making an accurate 
                                                                                                                           
31 Id. 
32 Ralph D. Gants & Erik N. Doughty, Where Science Conflicts with Common Sense: Eyewitness 
Identification Reform in Massachusetts, 79 ALB. L. REV. 1617, 1619 (2015) (footnotes omitted) (first 
citing Commonwealth v. Crayton, 21 N.E.3d 157, 252 (Mass. 2014); then citing Commonwealth v. 
Collins, 21 N.E.3d 528, 536–37 (Mass. 2014); and then citing Commonwealth v. Gomes, 22 N.E.3d 
897, 916–17 (Mass. 2015)). 
 33 See Gomes, 22 N.E.3d at 909 (describing the implications of relying only on common sense 
factors in eyewitness identification evidence). 34 Id.  
34 Id.  
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
2704 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:2697 
identification; (4) information from other witnesses or outside 
sources can affect the reliability of an identification and inflate an 
eyewitness’s confidence in the identification; and (5) viewing the 
same person in multiple identification procedures may increase the 
risk of misidentification.37 
 Gomes was a remarkable decision, remarkably rendered. It reflected mul-
tiple cases that had come before the court, substantial amicus briefing, the ex-
tensive work of the Study Group, and input from all corners of the criminal 
legal community. It aligned the law with science, and profoundly altered the 
legal landscape.38 To ensure that the law would continue to reflect the latest 
scientific developments, the SJC established a Standing Committee on Eyewit-
ness Identification to advise the court.39 The Chief Justice noted the scope of 
the effort he had initiated when he explained, 
[I]t takes a village to reach [the goal of reforming eyewitness identi-
fication law and practice]: police departments committed to using 
proper protocols in conducting eyewitness identification procedures, 
a Study Group and Committee that includes prosecutors and defense 
attorneys dedicated to examining the scientific research regarding 
eyewitness identification, and courts willing to revisit long-standing 
practices in light of research findings broadly embraced by the rele-
vant scientific community. Where common sense conflicts with reli-
able research, we must have the good sense to incorporate the re-
search into the law.40 
 Indeed, it took a village. Rather than being content with oracular state-
ments from the Commonwealth’s highest court, Justice Gants worked to create 
consensus in the legal community and in law enforcement, matching that of the 
scientific community. It was a formidable achievement. 
                                                                                                                           
37 Id. at 903 (footnotes omitted). 
38 One author noted the influence of the Chief Justice in taking account of the application of sci-
ence to law in later SJC decisions by other judges–requiring an instruction that “people may have 
greater difficulty in accurately identifying someone of a different race than someone of their own 
race,” in considering new scientific understanding of “shaken baby syndrome,” and in considering 
scientific research on adolescent brain development to “inform the definition of cruel and unusual 
punishment vis-à-vis late- teenaged offenders.” Haskell, supra note 13, at 28 (quoting Commonwealth 
v. Bastaldo, 32 N.E.3d 873, 883 (Mass. 2015)) (first citing Commonwealth v. Epps, 53 N.E.3d 1247 
(Mass. 2016); and then citing Commonwealth v. Watt, 146 N.E.3d 414 (Mass. 2020)). 
39 See Gants & Doughty, supra note 32, at 1626 (discussing the establishment of the Standing 
Committee on Eyewitness Identification) 
40 Id. at 1629. 
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III. LIMITING THE FELONY MURDER DOCTRINE AND  
FIRST-DEGREE MURDER THEORY 
From eyewitness identification to less publicized innovations in substan-
tive criminal law, Chief Justice Gants’s impact was unmistakable. In 2017, in 
Commonwealth v. Brown, Chief Justice Gants took on the common law felony 
murder rule—a relic from the English common law, now abolished in England 
and resoundingly criticized by scholars in the United States.41 In Brown, the 
SJC unanimously agreed that the felony murder rule, which permitted a con-
viction of murder in the first degree for the commission of an underlying vio-
lent felony resulting in a death, was constitutional.42 Chief Justice Gants, how-
ever, concurred in an opinion joined by a majority of the court in which he 
sought to narrow the rule to require actual malice, not constructive malice in-
ferred from the underlying felony.43 He reasoned that a defendant should not be 
convicted of murder without proof that they “intended to kill or to cause griev-
ous bodily harm, or intended to do an act which . . . a reasonable person would 
have known created a plain and strong likelihood that death would result.”44 The 
decision effected a sea change in felony murder law. Chief Justice Gants noted: 
Felony-murder liability is a creation of our common law, and this 
court is responsible for the content of that common law. When our 
experience with the common law of felony-murder liability demon-
strates that it can yield a verdict of murder in the first degree that is 
not consonant with justice, and where we recognize that it was de-
rived from legal principles we no longer accept and contravenes two 
fundamental principles of our criminal jurisprudence, we must re-
vise that common law so that it accords with those fundamental 
principles and yields verdicts that are just and fair in light of the de-
fendant’s criminal conduct.45 
He added, as only he would, “And if not now, when?”46 
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Castillo, Chief Justice Gants called for a 
change in the criterion for one of the two theories of first degree murder: mur-
                                                                                                                           
41 See 81 N.E.3d 1173, 1196–97 (Mass. 2017) (Gants, C.J., concurring) (recognizing the various 
criticisms and shortcomings of the felony murder rule). See generally Cameron Casey, Note, Cruel 
and Unusual: Why the Eighth Amendment Bans Charging Juveniles with Felony Murder, 61 B.C. L. 
REV. 2965 (2020) (describing the Eighth Amendment implications of utilizing the felony murder 
doctrine on juveniles). 
 42 81 N.E.3d at 1190. 
 43 Id. at 1191. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 1199. 
46 Id. (citing CHARLES TAYLOR, SAYINGS OF THE JEWISH FATHERS 23 (2d ed. 1897) (quoting 
Hillel the Elder)). 
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der with extreme atrocity or cruelty.47 Under this theory, the standard for con-
viction did not depend upon the defendant’s culpable conduct or intent, but 
rather, depended on the “consciousness and degree of suffering of the vic-
tim.”48 In plain language, Chief Justice Gants described why this was unfair 
and needed to be changed. 
[Under that standard,] a defendant [could be found] guilty of murder 
in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty if he 
shot a victim in the leg, precisely because he did not want to kill the 
victim, where the victim nonetheless died a painful death. In fact, 
the extent of a victim’s conscious suffering may bear on matters of 
chance or on whether the defendant was a poor shot, rather than on 
whether the conduct of the defendant was unusually atrocious or 
cruel.49 
 Again, as with the felony murder doctrine, the evolution of the common law 
of homicide was up to the SJC to change when justice so required—and it did. 
IV. EXPANDING BRADY PROTECTIONS FOR CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS 
 One of the most significant matters of Chief Justice Gants’s career was a 
case that he worked on just before he died. I called Chief Justice Gants when I 
heard that he had suffered a heart attack. He left a message to tell me that he 
was fine. He added a classic non sequitur, that I might want to look at his latest 
opinion in a grand jury matter. I called back and we chatted about his health, 
his family, and mine. He reminded me again—insistently this time—that I 
should look at his grand jury opinion. I did. It was masterful. 
The matter that his opinion was written for involved two police officers 
who admitted to filing false police reports regarding the use of force by a fel-
low officer.50 The two officers had observed, but did not participate in, the ar-
rest of a citizen charged with, among other things, resisting arrest.51 The arrest-
ing officer claimed the arrestee was threatening and needed force to be sub-
dued.52 This resulted in injuries to the arrestee.53 The two officers filed a report 
                                                                                                                           
47 153 N.E.3d 1210, 1214 (Mass. 2020). 
48 Id. at 1221. 
49 Id. The factors defining murder with “atrocity and cruelty” after Castillo were to focus only on 
the defendant’s conduct and intent: (1) “whether the defendant was indifferent to or took pleasure in 
the suffering of the deceased,” (2) “whether the defendant’s method or means of killing the deceased 
was reasonably likely to substantially increase or prolong the conscious suffering of the deceased,” 
and (3) “whether the means used by the defendant were excessive and out of proportion to what would 
be needed to kill a person.” Id.at 1223 (citations omitted). 
 50 In re Grand Jury Investigation, 152 N.E.3d 65, 70 (Mass. 2020). 
 51 Id. at 71. 
 52 Id. 
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confirming that account.54 Video of the incident showed the opposite: the of-
ficer had struck the arrestee without provocation.55 
During the grand jury investigation into the offending officer’s conduct, 
the other officer witnesses admitted to lying in their reports.56 The District At-
torney sought permission from the Superior Court to disclose the confidential 
grand jury information to criminal defendants in other cases in which these 
officers were potential witnesses.57 
In 2020, Chief Justice Gants wrote for the court in Matter of Grand Jury 
Investigation, and concluded that disclosure was required.58 He reasoned that 
the constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory evidence pursuant to Brady v. 
Maryland, covered not only evidence of innocence but also evidence that re-
lated to the credibility of key witnesses.59 Indeed, beyond the Brady rule, Mas-
sachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure and the rules of Professional Conduct 
require the disclosure of all evidence or information that “negate[s] the guilt” 
or “mitigates the offense.”60 Chief Justice Gants added a powerful coda to the 
decision when he suggested that a prosecutor should not engage in brinksman-
ship about a defendant’s due process rights: 
A prosecutor should not attempt to determine how much exculpatory 
information can be withheld without violating a defendant’s right to 
a fair trial. Rather, once the information is determined to be exculpa-
tory, it should be disclosed—period. And where a prosecutor is un-
certain whether information is exculpatory, the prosecutor should err 
on the side of caution and disclose it.61 
 Further, Chief Justice Gants made it clear that whenever a prosecutor has 
information that “a police officer lied to conceal the unlawful use of excessive 
force . . . or lied about a defendant’s conduct” to heighten the charges, the 
prosecutor was required to disclose that information “in any criminal case 
where the officer is a potential witness or prepared a report in the criminal in-
vestigation.”62 The decision was a Gants classic, dealing with the case at hand, 
but understanding fully and completely the implications of his decision to 
make the system more just. 
                                                                                                                           
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 70. 
 55 Id. at 71. 
 56 Id. at 70. 
 57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 74 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)). 
 60 Id. 
61 Id. at 76. 
62 Id. at 82. 
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CONCLUSION 
Chief Justice Gants left us far too soon, but he left behind an indelible le-
gal legacy. Nowhere is that clearer than in his criminal law jurisprudence. The 
late Chief Justice was a tireless voice in eliminating mandatory minimum sen-
tencing and tackling racial inequities in the Commonwealth. From moving the 
needle on eyewitness identification, to felony murder doctrine, to Brady pro-
tections, Chief Justice Gants never backed away from reevaluating legal doc-
trines that were unfair or unjust, no matter what their pedigree. 
In his 2015 State of the Judiciary speech, Chief Justice Gants said: 
[T]wo principles that come from the Jewish religious tradition, but 
probably are shared by nearly every religious tradition. The first is 
that each of us has an obligation to repair the world. The second is 
that, if you save one life, it is as if you have saved the entire world. 
In our courts, we seek to repair the world, sometimes even save the 
world, one person at a time. 63 
And he did. 
                                                                                                                           
63 Ralph D. Gants, Chief J., Mass. Supreme Jud. Ct., Annual Address: State of the Judiciary 3 
(Oct. 20, 2015) (transcript available from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court), https://www.
mass.gov/doc/2015-state-of-the-judiciary-address-by-sjc-chief-justice-ralph-d-gants-oct-20-2015/
download [https://perma.cc/Y8FD-WQD2]. 
